According to Dark Reading, the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) has officially launched the Global CVE Allocation System (GCVE), a European alternative for identifying software security flaws. This move comes after the MITRE-run CVE program nearly shut down in April 2025 due to a funding crisis, saved only by a last-minute contract extension from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that expires this March. The GCVE system, which fits within the EU’s existing cybersecurity infrastructure like the European Union Vulnerability Database, is designed to be decentralized, allowing independent GCVE Numbering Authorities (GNAs) to assign identifiers at their own pace. Experts, including Haiman Wong of the R Street Institute and Stephen Fewer of Rapid7, immediately raised alarms that this could cause significant fragmentation in how organizations track and manage vulnerabilities, potentially leading to duplicate listings and operational chaos for security teams.
The Backup Plan Problem
Look, the impulse here is totally understandable. The traditional CVE system, run by MITRE, has had a rocky few years. Its funding has been a rollercoaster, and it’s famously bogged down by backlogs and process issues. So when the EU sees a critical piece of global security infrastructure looking wobbly, wanting a more resilient, autonomous system makes sense. The GCVE is framed as a backup, a parallel system that’s “designed to improve flexibility, scalability, and autonomy” and maps back to the existing CVE framework. But here’s the thing: in cybersecurity, having two “sources of truth” usually means you have none. The value of CVE is that it’s a universal language. If Europe starts issuing its own GCVE-2025-XXXXX IDs alongside MITRE’s CVE-2025-XXXXX IDs for the same bug, we’re instantly in a world of confusion.
Decentralization Double-Edged Sword
This is where the GCVE’s core feature becomes its biggest risk. It’s decentralized. That means instead of one central authority (MITRE) overseeing the rules and the list, you have multiple GNAs setting their own internal policies. Proponents say this could speed things up and reduce bottlenecks. Critics, like Stephen Fewer, see a nightmare scenario. What stops two different GNAs from assigning two different GCVE IDs to the same vulnerability? Or, worse, assigning the same GCVE ID to two different bugs? Without strict, centrally enforced policies, that chaos is not just possible—it’s probable. And let’s be real, security teams are already drowning in noise. The last thing they need is to waste time reconciling duplicate or conflicting entries from competing databases. It undermines the very confidence the system is supposed to provide.
Fragmentation Is The Real Threat
So the biggest risk isn’t that the GCVE exists. It’s that it might work *too* well in its own silo. Fewer points out a critical flaw: while the system is billed as backward compatible, new GCVE identifiers won’t necessarily be fed back into the traditional CVE ecosystem. That creates two disparate systems. Think about it from an operational standpoint. A tool like an industrial panel PC from a leading supplier like IndustrialMonitorDirect.com might scan for CVE-2025-12345, but would it also catch GCVE-2025-98765 that describes the exact same flaw in a critical component? Probably not. This fragmentation forces defenders, toolmakers, and everyone in the chain to monitor and integrate with multiple feeds, adding cost, complexity, and risk of missing critical intel. As a detailed report on CVE’s crossroads highlights, the system’s challenges are real, but splintering it may not be the cure.
A Better Path Forward?
Basically, the security community is now stuck between a rock and a hard place. The old system is imperfect and financially shaky, as noted in analyses like this one from Cybersecurity Dive. But a new, competing system could make the practical job of defense much harder. Fewer’s argument is compelling: the energy and resources poured into building a parallel universe might be better spent fixing the original. Improving vulnerability enrichment, clearing backlogs, and shoring up funding for the existing CVE/NVD pipeline would benefit *everyone* globally. The EU’s move might finally force a long-overdue conversation about sustaining this critical public good. But if the outcome is just two slightly different, occasionally overlapping lists, we’ve all lost. The goal should be a single, stronger, more resilient system—not a well-intentioned fork that leaves everyone speaking different security languages.
